

Timeline of U.S. Federal Government Activity Identifying and Addressing Unsecure sUAS

August 2017: The **U.S. Army** [discontinued](#) the use of all DJI drones, referencing a classified Army Research Laboratory report on user vulnerabilities.

August 2017: A **Department of Homeland Security** intelligence [bulletin](#) noted that, “since 2015, DJI has targeted a number of U.S. companies in the critical infrastructure and law enforcement sectors to market its UAS,” and, “the Chinese government is likely using information acquired from DJI systems as a way to target assets.”

May 2019: The **Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency** released a threat [memo](#) reinforcing the serious security risk associated with PRC drones.

December 2019: **Congress** [passed](#) the FY 2020 National Defense Authorization Act, which prohibits the Department of Defense from purchasing drones made by companies based in China in Section.

October 2020: The **Department of Justice** [banned](#) the use of agency grants for purchasing Chinese drones, citing national security concerns, noting the drones are “subject to or vulnerable to extrajudicial direction from a foreign government.”

October 2020: The **Department of Interior** [grounded](#) all Chinese drones in its fleet, noting cybersecurity risks.

December 2020: The **Department of Commerce** placed DJI on the [Entity List](#) and Department of the Treasury placed DJI on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s [list](#) of Chinese tech firms that are part of the Chinese military-industrial complex. These lists restrict U.S. investments in DJI based on allegations of support of human rights abuses against the Uyghur people. It is U.S. government policy to combat forced labor in Xinjiang.

January 2021: **President Trump** [issued](#) Executive Order 13981 to “prohibit the use of taxpayer dollars to procure UAS that present unacceptable risks and are manufactured by...foreign adversaries, and to encourage the use of domestically produced UAS.” **President Biden** has continued this policy under his Administration.

July 2021: The **Department of Defense** released a [statement](#) labeling DJI as posing “potential threats to national security” in a statement dedicated to the Pentagon’s concerns about the company.

October 2022: The **Department of Defense** [identified](#) DJI as a “Chinese military company” operating in the U.S. under Section 1260H of the FY 2021 NDAA, which catalogs companies that the DoD believes contribute to the modernization goals of the People’s Liberation Army.

December 2022: In the Fiscal Year 2023 NDAA, **Congress** [expanded](#) the existing FY 2020 NDAA restrictions to also prohibit private companies working with the DoD from using unsecure drones in the performance of federal contracts. Congress also directs the U.S. Coast Guard to transition their drone fleet to secure systems within 90 days.

September 2023: AUVSI launched the Partnership for Drone Competitiveness - a coalition of leading U.S. and allied drone and drone component manufacturers and enterprise users of drones seeking policies to enable a level playing field.

November 2023: Members of **Congress** serving on the Select Committee on the Chinese Community Party [wrote](#) to the Secretaries of Defense, Treasury, and Commerce asking that Autel also be added to the Commerce Entity list, the DoD Chinese Military Companies list, and the Treasury Non-SDN Chinese Military Industrial Complex List. The letter describes Autel’s affiliation with the Peoples’ Liberation Army.

December 2023: **Congress** [passed](#), and **President Biden** [signed](#) into law, the American Security Drone Act as part of the FY 2024 National Defense Authorization Act. The measure extends the DOD procurement ban on drones from “covered entities” (PRC, Iran, Russia, and North Korea) to all U.S. government agencies and prohibits federal agencies from operating these drones.

January 2024: The **Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency** and **Federal Bureau of Investigation** released an updated [warning memo](#) noting that, “The use of Chinese-manufactured UAS in critical infrastructure operations risks exposing sensitive information to PRC authorities, jeopardizing U.S. national security, economic security, and public health and safety.