We Need to Protect Our Troops Against Drones Now

April 2, 2024 | Dawn Zoldi

By: Dawn Zoldi (Colonel, USAF Retired) 

In late January, a drone attack killed three American soldiers at a U.S. military base in Jordan. More recently, a German ship errantly fired two missiles at a U.S. drone over the Red Sea. To be sure, detecting, identifying, tracking and mitigating friendly versus enemy drones remains a wicked hard problem which will require a multi-layered technological approach to address. IFF (“Identify Friend or Foe”) transponders rank high among the technologies. They can positively distinguish friendly aircraft from those of the enemy using broadcast transmissions with secure data encryption. Today, they are small, cheap and effective – yet virtually no one is using them ubiquitously on drones. Without IFF or a similar technology on all friendly aircraft we can’t automate our counter drone systems, and remain dependent on suboptimal manual defenses against this widespread threat. Unless Congress acts fast, our troops will remain at risk. 

And that will cost more lives. 

The kicker is that IFF is not a “new” technology. The military has been using some version of this critical command and control (C2) tech on all of its crewed aircraft since World War II. In simple terms, the IFF system comprises an airborne transponder paired with either a ground or airborne interrogator. This setup gauges the aircraft’s distance and direction while the transponder conveys identification and positional data in its response. It essentially communicates, “I exist here, and I am not a threat.” 

So, why have the U.S., its allies and partners not outfitted their drones with IFF? The problem does not hinge on technology; it revolves around innovation and will. 

We have the technology today; we just might not have it in the form that we need to effectively outfit all of our aircraft. Traditional certified IFF systems can weigh anywhere from 6 to 12lbs and are the same size as a one gallon paint can.  However, innovative avionics companies have recently produced IFF systems up to nine times smaller and six or more times lighter than customary systems. 

For example, three years ago, U.S.-based Sagetech Avionics, launched the world’s first military grade 17-1000 Mark XIIB certified micro Mode 5 IFF transponder, the MX12B.  This transponder set new benchmarks for size and weight (the size of a deck of cards and weighing one-third of a pound). In addition to IFF functionalities, the MX12B boasts additional features, including ADS-B In capability which allows it to track up to 400 friendly targets at the same time and present them through the C2 graphical user interface (GUI) to troops. This significantly enhanced battlespace awareness. 

That said, even these smallest IFF systems, when combined with the other required tech in the system, can collectively weigh up to one pound. This works just fine for a Group 3 (between 55 and 1320 lbs.) or larger drone. In fact, it appears that during the German blue-on-blue incident, the U.S. MQ-9 may have had a transponder – it just was not turned on, or was not interrogated by the German Frigate. (Note – there are many reasons why a military drone would want to remain dark. But there are ways to share IFF-related information with partners that would have prevented this from happening. We further discuss concepts of operations below). 

Future conflicts, however, will presumably involve large numbers of smaller and cheaper drones. Recent conflicts show small weaponized commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) drones will be the vast majority of things flying around in the air. These will require something much lighter. We know that using some sort of IFF systems on smaller drones can be done. The Russians have already done it, since they recognize the critical need of this type of technology in modern warfare. 

Cost does not present a roadblock here. Even at an attrition rate of tens of thousands small drones a month, outfitting all of them with modified IFF would require nothing more than budget dust. Retrofitting the current fleet, and adding small size, weight and power (SWaP) IFF systems would likely come at a cost below 10% of traditional systems. If produced and integrated at mass volume, those prices would come down even further. 

But change is hard. And the will to change may be one of the primary obstacles to widespread adoption of IFF across all of the Services and beyond. The first step would require breaking down programmatic stovepipes. For example, the “drone” offices need to closely work with the “counter-drone” (counter-UAS or C-UAS) offices because C-UAS tech will need to incorporate IFF as part of the autonomous identification process. Relatedly, across the board, concepts of operations and training will require modification to foster understanding and the use of IFF. 

History has shown that the military works hand-in-hand with industry to adapt and overcome when presented with a new threat. When our troops in Iraq were being slaughtered by roadside improvised explosive devices (IEDs), industry answered the call with Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. 

The time for such innovation and collaboration is now. Even if we don’t know a lot about the Jordan or German incidents, we know we have a problem that won’t go away. We know that a hostile drone came into our facility and blew up and killed our people. We know that the Germans shot at a friendly Reaper.  

We also know that if IFF had been used properly, neither one of these incidents would have happened. 

The value proposition of IFF is clear. The value-add of IFF has been proven with decades of use on the battlefield. The time is now for Congress to legislate on, and fund for, the technologies that will protect our troops from drones.